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Abstract
This paper uses a linked employer-employee dataset from the Ghanaian manufacturing
sector to analyze earnings dispersion in Ghana from 1992 to 2003, a period post
extensive economic reforms. I find that variance of earnings increased from 1992 to
1998 and decreased thereafter, resembling an inverted u-shaped relationship. I use
analysis of variance and variance decomposition approaches to understand the
underlying factors that led to such a pattern in earnings inequality. I find that
between-firm factors explain this pattern more than within-firm factors. I also find that
the mean earnings gap between workers above and below the 90th percentile of
income distribution can explain the majority of the initial surge in inequality (61 %) but
only explains a very small fraction of the eventual decline (9 %). I run OLS regressions
similar to Mincerian equations and decompose the variance components to find that
the decline in earnings inequality is consistent with decline in variance of firm-level
earnings whereas variance of predicted wage from worker characteristics have
increased. I also find suggestive evidence of changing patterns of worker-firm sorting
which contributes to the decline in inequality. These patterns however only hold up for
private domestic firms and not for foreign-owned firms.
JEL Codes: J31, O15
Keywords: Wage dispersion, Inequality, Firm effects, Analysis of variance, Variance
decomposition
1 Introduction
The role of the employing firm in explaining worker wage inequality has been little stud-
ied empirically until a very recent paper by Barth et al. (2016). The environment in which
a worker is working may have direct and indirect consequences on his eventual earn-
ings through measured or unmeasured channels. The idea of unmeasured worker ability
on the one hand and pure industry or firm effects on the other hand are believed to be
important factors affecting observed wage dispersion as is documented in the literature
on effects of firms on worker wage setting (Dickens and Katz 1987; Davis and Haltiwanger
1991; Abowd et al. 1999; Card et al. 2013a; Card et al. 2013b).
Existing empirical work has shown that separately identifying the effects using longitu-
dinal data is difficult. Hamermesh (2008) points out that the effect would be overstated in
favor of the group on which more information is available. So, if information on workers
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is richer than that on firms, the estimated effect of workers would look a lot bigger than
that of firms and vice-versa. This is more of a concern if we believe that the worker
and firm characteristics are correlated. Hamermesh notes that this is less of a problem if
we have a matched employer-employee dataset. In this paper, I use matched data from
the Ghanaian manufacturing industry to analyze the role of firms in observed wage dis-
persion among workers. The empirical methodology of this paper closely follows Barth
et al. (2016).
Barth et al. (2016) is, to the best of my knowledge, the only paper that studies the role
of establishments in explaining wage inequality using US data. I apply their methodology
to study the same question in a developing country setting. I attempt to replicate most
of their results in the context of the Ghanaian manufacturing sector. This contributes to
the literature as the first paper to study wage dispersion from the perspective of the firm
effects in a developing economy. Additionally, I look at how patterns of inequality vary
by firm ownership type. Specifically, are private firms owned domestically different from
foreign-owned firms? Are the firm effects explaining wage dispersion different based on
ownership structure?1
In the Ghanaian manufacturing sector, the majority of the firms are in the private
sector.2 This is largely due to the extensive economic reforms that have been implemented
since the mid to late 1980s. An additional contribution of this paper is therefore in terms
of analyzing earnings in the post-reform era in Ghana.3 I find an unusual and very inter-
esting pattern of wage inequality in the Ghanaian manufacturing sector in this period. In
the early periods, the variance in worker earnings increased, but towards the end of the
1990s, the variance in earnings actually decreased. One rather speculative explanation for
this could be that reforms were sinking in gradually, and by the time the full effects of the
reforms were realized, inequality started to decline. However, while this pattern is true
for domestic private firms in Ghana, firms with other types of ownership did not witness
this decline in the later periods and they experience a secular increase in variance of earn-
ings. Much of this paper is focused on analyzing this interesting pattern and describing
the potential role of the firm component in this.
Although Sandefur (2010) points out that the firm size in the Ghanaian manufacturing
sector decreased by almost 50 %, this is not necessarily contradictory to the findings of
this paper. It has been documented that smaller firms in developing countries are often
more productive (De and Nagaraj 2014). This is especially relevant because in the nascent
stages, just after reforms have taken place, it may be harder to manage larger firms and
gather resources to invest in research and development. Smaller firm sizes may lead to
better managed firms with minimal administrative issues and that may lead to a better
work environment and establish equity in pay as a result of these efficiency gains.4 As I
will show later in this paper, the decline in inequality in the Ghanaian setup seems to be
driven by the fact that the earnings gap narrows down over time. So even if the idea of
firm sizes halving following reforms seem to be perceived as a perverse consequence, with
decline in inequality as documented by this paper, the welfare implications of the reforms
are not obvious.5
Analyzing the variance components, I find that the pattern of inequality observed in the
data is explained mainly by fluctuations in the between-firm variation. The within-firm
variation has been steadily increasing. The initial rise in variance and the later fall seem to
be due to variation between-firms rather than within-firms. It is important to understand
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if this pattern can be explained by gains and losses made by the workers at the top of the
earnings distribution. Interestingly, I find that while net gains to workers above the 90th
percentile can explain about 61 % of the initial surge in variance, it only explains about
9 % of the later fall. This suggests that workers below the 90th percentile must have made
significant gains in the later stages which resulted in closing down of the earnings gap.
I further analyze the interaction of worker and firm characteristics in a regression set-
ting and find that the variance in workers’ predicted wage from observable characteristics
have increased over time whereas the variance of the firms’ effect on wages have declined
over time. This pattern is observed for the average firm and on average for firms owned
privately by domestic Ghanaians. For foreign-owned firms, however, this is not repli-
cated. The data suggests that the inverted u-shaped pattern of variances of log real hourly
earnings for private firms can mostly be explained by a decline in the firm-specific effect
at the latter stages. The correlation between the contribution of individual attributes to
wages and the firm effect have declined over time. This suggests that firms have gradually
hired workers by observable characteristics, independent of firm-specific earnings, or in
other words, their preference towards hiring similar workers within a firm has decreased.
I find that for high-skilled workers, inequality increases over time whereas it declines for
low-skilled workers.
2 Background
2.1 The Ghanaian manufacturing sector
The Ghanaian economy went through economic reforms from 1983 to 1991. The man-
ufacturing sector was believed to be the engine through which employment generation
and long-term economic growth would be attained (see Teal 1998). However, as discussed
above, it is unclear as to whether the reforms didmore harm than good to themanufactur-
ing sector especially as firms started becoming smaller and literature suggests that smaller
firms have lesser potential to grow (see Sandefur 2010). An immediate consequence of
providing impetus to themanufacturing sector is that demand for skilled labor would rise.
This was no different for Ghana particularly because the two most flourishing manufac-
turing sectors in Ghana were wood products and textiles. Detailed review of the impact
of reforms on the Ghanaian economy can be found in Baah-Nuakoh and Teal (1993). The
manufacturing sector has contributed consistently to around 8–10 % of the GDP of Ghana
ever since the reforms. Even though by standards expected by the reform, this may look
like a small number but the sector employs over 250,000 people.6 Apart from wood and
textiles, food processing, smelting, oil refining, cement, and pharmaceuticals are other
important sectors in manufacturing in Ghana. A rising concern for the sector is the influx
of cheap goods from other economies like China which have massive comparative advan-
tages in manufacturing. This is not just a concern for the Ghanaian economy but most
of the western African nations. A recent study by Szabo (2016) points out the inefficien-
cies in the manufacturing sector of Ghana. Szabo estimates production functions for the
manufacturing firms and finds that firms mostly use more capital and less labor than the
optimal amount.
In this backdrop, it is worthwhile to look at the wage patterns in the Ghanaian man-
ufacturing sector which has been the center of attention for Ghanaian policymakers. It
remains indeterminate whether the sector has given the economy the necessary fillip
towards economic growth but we can see how much wages have changed over time in
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this sector post the reforms and whether the predominance of private ownership has had
significant effects on worker wages or not. Existing research has pointed out that there is
a link between economic growth and wage dispersion in African economies (see Agesa
et al. 2011 for details in the context of Kenya).
2.2 Related literature and conceptual framework
The study of wage dispersion usingmatched employer-employee datasets has gained pop-
ularity in the last decade and a half. Abowd et al. (1999) in their seminal paper introduced
the use of a linked employer-employee dataset to run an additively separable fixed effects
framework using French data to disentangle the true effect of a firm from that of the
worker.
Fafchamps et al. (2009) studied the African manufacturing sector and analyzed the role
of sorting in explaining wage gaps. Not much is known however in terms of the role of
firms in explaining dispersion in such poor countries. This paper is an attempt to fill
this void in the literature. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to use a matched
employer-employee dataset to look at wage dispersion by ownership pattern for a devel-
oping country. In particular, the idea is to see if private domestic ownership of firms leads
to higher or lower wage dispersion as compared to foreign ownership. This paper does
not attempt to provide a theoretical explanation as to why wage inequality may differ by
ownership type, but the objective is to empirically examine whether such patterns exist in
the data.
In the empirical sections of this paper, I run my analyses on two different sub-samples
of firms in the Ghanaian manufacturing sector, viz, the private domestic firms and the
firms with some foreign ownership. There are many reasons as to why this distinction is
of academic interest. First, a body of literature analyzes the impact of FDI inflows on wage
dispersion (Saglam and Sayek 2011; Heyman et al. 2011; Almeida 2007 andMartins 2004).
The findings generally indicate that foreign firms lead to higher wage dispersion and
also pay higher actual wages. One explanation is that foreign-owned firms hire skilled
workers and that leads to dispersion. Also, lower skilled workers sort to other firms, and
hence, inter- and intra-firm dispersion rises. Second, in what could be regarded as com-
peting theories of the above, several studies suggest that globalization actually leads to
reduction in inequality through a decline in wage premium to education in developing
countries (see Rama 2002 for a review of this literature). Since the period of study in
this paper corresponds to the period post economic reforms in Ghana, it is of interest to
check if foreign-owned firms actually differ from private firms in terms of their effects on
inequality in worker wages.
3 Empirical methodology
3.1 Analysis of variance
The empirical strategy I adopt is largely descriptive but provides valuable insight nonethe-
less. I do a variance decomposition of log real hourly earnings into within-firm and
between-firm elements. I follow the method of Barth et al. (2016) throughout this paper
and analyze the variance components as follows:
Var(lnwif) = Var(Elnwif) + Var(lnwif − Elnwif) (1)
where lnwif is the log real hourly earnings (before taxes) for individual ‘i’ working at firm ‘f ’.
Elnwif represents the expected value of earnings of workers working at firm ‘f ’. Var(Elnwif)
is the between-firm variance, and Var(lnwif − Elnwif) is the within-firm variance.
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3.2 Percentile analysis: contribution of earnings gap to variance
Barth et al. (2016) also propose an arithmetic decomposition of the variance in log real
earnings to calculate the contribution of the difference in mean earnings for various
groups of individuals on the actual variance based on the percentile distribution of earn-
ings. Suppose we want to compare individuals above the pth percentile to those below
the pth percentile. Then, if E(p) is the mean of log real hourly earnings of the top p%
and E(100 − p) is the mean log real hourly earnings for the remaining workers, then the
variance can be decomposed as follows:
Var(lnw) = p100 ·
100 − p
100 ·[E(p)−E(100−p)]




For this paper, I will focus on the earnings gap at the 90th percentile. So the above
reduces to
Var(lnw) = (0.1) · (0.9)·[E(10) − E(90)]2 +(0.1) · Var(10) + (0.9) · Var(90) (3)
The contribution of the earnings gap to variances is therefore given by the term (0.1) ·
(0.9)·[E(10) − E(90)]2.
3.3 Worker characteristics and firm fixed effects
The third and final strategy of this paper is to run OLS regressions for time periods ‘t’ as
follows:
lnwif = β .Xif + δf + uif (4)
The vector Xif includes worker characteristics like hours worked, age, age squared,
experience, experience squared, education, education squared, potential’ experience, and
potential experience squared for worker i in firm f. Using the methodology described in
Barth et al. (2016), I decompose the variance of Eq. 4 as follows:
Var(lnw) = Var(κ) + Var(δ) + 2cov(κ , δ) + Var(u) (5)
In the above, κ = X · βˆ and represents the predicted earnings from observable worker
characteristics. The term Var(δ) represents the variance of earnings among firms or the
variance of the firm fixed effects. Another statistic of interest is the degree of how sim-
ilar workers are within a given firm, ρδ = cov(κ ,δ)Var(κ) . Barth et al. (2016) note that if ρδ is
close to zero, firms are independently hiring workers based on observed characteristics,
independent of firm earnings.
4 Data
The dataset for this study is a panel survey of the Ghanaian manufacturing sector
which covers the years (waves) 1992 to 2003. The survey was the joint venture of Cen-
ter for Study of African Economies (CSAE), the University of Oxford, the University of
Ghana, Legon and the Ghana Statistical Office for the Regional Project for Enterprise
Development (RPED), and Ghana Manufacturing Enterprise Survey (see Data Source
Acknowledgment).7 The original sample of firms was drawn randomly from the 1987
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census of manufacturing activities of Ghana. From each of the firms, a sample of work-
ers were also interviewed in this period. This allows pooling the two databases to form a
comprehensive employer-employee dataset. The original sample had 200 firms in 1992,
and firms were added in later waves/years to take care of attrition and other issues. The
firms were followed over the years, and therefore, the firm dataset has a panel component
whereas the worker component of the data should be regarded as repeated cross sections.
Figure 1 shows the shares of firms by ownership categories from our sample. It appears
that the majority of firms are privately owned but some have foreign ownership. For the
eventual empirical analysis, I am going to break down the sample into firms owned and
managed by private Ghanaian agents, viz, private domestic firms and firms with some
foreign ownership. The latter would include firms partially or wholly owned by foreign
owners. The remainder of the firms are state owned. Table 1 shows some descriptive
statistics from plant-level data. Column (1) reports means for all firms whereas columns
(2) and (3) report means for the other two categories. All the means are averages across
12 years of data. Figure 2 gives the time series plots of plant-level averages of some of
these observables by ownership types.
The average firm has about 75 workers whereas this number is much smaller for pri-
vate domestic firms (34) and much higher for foreign-owned firms (194). The number
of skilled workers as identified by the firms in their responses to the survey question is
14 on average for the whole sample whereas for private domestic, it is much smaller at
around 7 skilled workers per firm. The average education of workers is about 10 years
across firm types. Foreign-owned firms seem to have workers with higher average age
and potential experience compared to the overall average. Most foreign-owned firms are
located in the capital city of Accra. I also find that foreign firms are more likely to export
goods compared to private domestic firms. Value of total output is higher for foreign
firms throughout the span of the data. There is not much difference in the hours worked
by the average worker in these firms although it is slightly less for foreign-owned firms.
Foreign-owned firms also have higher wage bills. In terms of input usage and capital, the
Fig. 1 Share of firms by ownership type
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics
All firms Private domestic Any foreign
(1) (2) (3)
Number of workers 74.50 34.53 194.41
Number of skilled workers 13.69 6.85 35.01
Years of education of average worker 10.02 9.65 10.99
Potential experience of average worker 15.26 6.85 35.01
Age of average worker (in years) 32.60 30.11 39.32
Weekly hours worked by average worker 45.90 46.87 43.56
Located in Accra (= 1 if yes) 0.59 0.53 0.70
Log annual wage bills 16.58 15.77 18.68
Log real output 17.36 16.69 19.41
Exports (=1 if yes) 0.33 0.29 0.46
Log replacement value of plants and machinery 17.67 16.65 20.80
Percentage of inputs imported 22.03 19.13 32.56
Observations (firm × years) 2400 1464 804
Notes: Data comes from the CSAE-RPED database as discussed in the data section. Any foreign corresponds to firms partially or
wholly owned by foreigners. Private domestic refers to firms owned and managed by private Ghanaian resident entrepreneurs.
Total observations are 2400; for private domestic, it is 1464; and for foreign owned, it is 804. Remaining 132 are observations for
state firms. All figures are means computed from plant-level database of 200 firms overall for 12 years
data suggests that on average, 22 % of the inputs are imported. This number is some-
what smaller at under 20 % for private domestic firms but significantly higher at 33 % for
foreign-owned firms. In terms of replacement value of plant and machinery, the mean for
foreign firms is above the average and that for private domestic is below the average for
all firms.
Fig. 2 Time series plots of firm averages by ownership types: firm dataset of 200 firms over 12 years
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5 Results
5.1 Within-firm and between-firm effects
Figure 3 is indicative of how log real hourly earnings varied in Ghana over the years
(1992–2003).8 A striking feature of this graph is that the variance of earnings seem to
resemble an inverted u-shape for Ghanaian manufacturing firms. The variances seem to
have increased from 1992 to around 1998 after which the variances show a decline in
trend. This is intriguing because unlike secular increases in earnings inequality which are
common in the developed world, including the USA, here, I observe a decline after an
initial surge. A possible explanation for this pattern in the Ghanaian manufacturing sec-
tor could be the reforms that happened extensively in the late 1980s and continued into
the early 1990s. It is plausible that the effects of the reforms on the manufacturing sector,
especially for the domestic firms, started accruing around the mid-1990s. This might be
the reason that earnings inequality appears to have been checked since 1998 and into the
2000s. A feature of the Ghanaian manufacturing sector was over-staffing. It is believed
that post-reform, this has reduced a lot.9 This may have also contributed to paying work-
ers more efficiently and a resultant decline in earnings inequality. In Fig. 3, I also look
at composition of this variance change for different ownership categories. The Ghanaian
manufacturing sector is dominated by private firms. So, I restrict my analysis only to such
firms and find that the inverted u-shaped pattern is replicated only for domestic firms
and not for the partly or wholly foreign-owned firms.
The rest of this paper delves deeper into this phenomenon and attempts to analyze the
components underlying such patterns of dispersion. The preceding discussion leads us
Fig. 3 Variances of log real hourly earnings by ownership type
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into the following question: are these patterns due to within-firm or between-firm vari-
ation in worker earnings and how do changes in these components reconcile the overall
trends in dispersion? To answer this question, I decompose the variances following Eq. 1.
The results are reported in Table 2. I report the total variance of log real hourly earnings
along with the within and between components for three different years, viz, 1992, 1998,
and 2003, to illustrate how the change in overall variances compare to the change in the
within and between components. I find that for all firms, the within-firm variation has
increased over time from 0.444 in 1992 to 0.514 in 1998 and 0.748 in 2003. The inverted
u-shape of the total variance curve seems to be explained therefore by the between-
firm component of earnings. It must arithmetically be the case that the between-firm
component rises from 0.661 to 0.862 but it falls to 0.319 in the latter half.
Looking at changes over time, I find that the total variance increased in the early period
and declined in the latter by a larger magnitude. The change in within-firm variation
increased. So what drives this decline is likely to be the change in between-firm variation.
It appears that the change in between-firm variance declined from 0.201 to −0.541.
In Table 3, I analyze the overall variances in earnings by firm type. There are some
interesting patterns to note. For private domestic firms, variance seems to be initially flat
but declines in the latter period whereas for private foreign firms, it seems to increase
in the early period and remain stable in the latter period. If an influx of foreign invest-
ment disproportionately attracts skilled labor, this may lead to rising inequality in the
other sector, viz, domestic in our case.10 Another interesting feature of the economy that
this data brings up is the fact that firms with some foreign ownership always have lower
inequality than firms domestically owned and managed. This is consistent with the idea
that economic reforms may lead to removal of trade barriers, and as a result, foreign firms
are now able to hire skilled laborers and unskilled workers sort into private firms based
on the firms’ comparative advantages. As a result, inequality is a lot lower in levels for
foreign firms for whom demand for skilled labor would rise following their comparative
advantage in employing skilled workers. This also explains why inequality would decrease
overall. Before the reforms, even the high-skilled workers would have had to work in ‘infe-
rior’ firms due to trade barriers and the absence of foreign firms. These private firms have
a comparative disadvantage in employing these high-skilled workers who can move into
foreign firms as economic reforms sink in. Again, this hypothesis is not testable with the




Total variance 1.105 1.376 1.067
Within 0.444 0.514 0.748
Between 0.661 0.862 0.319
Decomposing the change over time 1992–1998 1998–2003
Total change 0.271 −0.305
Within change 0.070 0.234
Between change 0.201 −0.541
Data from CSAE-RPED on the Ghanaian manufacturing sector from 1992 to 2003. I matched the worker and firm files to create the
linked dataset based on which I perform the analysis. The arithmetic calculations are based on the method described in
Section 3.1 in the text
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Table 3 Variances of log real hourly earnings of workers by ownership type
1992 1998 2003
(1) (2) (3)
Total variance 1.105 1.376 1.067
Firms with full domestic ownership 1.321 1.343 1.147
Firms with some foreign ownership 0.311 0.671 0.834
Data from CSAE-RPED on the Ghanaian manufacturing sector from 1992 to 2003. I matched the worker and firm files to create the
linked dataset based on which I perform the analysis. The arithmetic calculations are based on the method described in
Section 3.1 in the text
dataset I am using as there are no pre-reform time period available, so one must be con-
servative in interpreting the findings in this way. However, the data nonetheless provides
suggestive evidence along these lines.
5.2 Percentile analysis
Given that we observe the inverted u-shaped pattern for variances in log real hourly
earnings, the question of gainers versus losers assumes importance. The purpose of this
exercise is to estimate whether gains to the workers at the top of the earnings distribu-
tion has contributed to the inequality. For our unique case, this question can be re-framed
to accommodate the decline in inequality at the latter stages to see if top earners have
lost out on the gains they made or have the rest of the workers caught up. I perform the
empirical analysis described in the empirical methodology section above and focus on the
decomposition as per Eq. 3.11
Table 4 presents the relevant results. I break up the analysis into two periods of time,
viz, the surge phase (1992–1998) and the decline phase (1998–2003). In panel A, I analyze
the surge phase. Column 2 reports statistics from 1992, column 3 reports statistics from
1998, and column 4 reports the changes from 1992 to 1998. I find that the variance of log
real hourly earnings increased by 0.271 log points from 1.105 in 1992 to 1.376 in 1998. I
calculate the means of log real hourly earnings for two sets of workers, viz, above the 90th
Table 4 Contribution of earnings gap to variance in earnings
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A 1992 1998 Change
Variance (log real hourly earnings) 1.105 1.376 0.271
Mean (log real hourly earnings) above 90th percentile 5.988 6.488
Mean (log real hourly earnings) below 90th percentile 4.339 4.350
Difference in means (above–below 90th percentile) 1.649 2.138
Contribution of difference in means to variance 0.245 0.411 0.166
Percentage of total change in variance 61.25
Panel B 1998 2003 Change
Variance (log real hourly earnings) 1.376 1.067 −0.309
Mean (log real hourly earnings) above 90th percentile 6.488 7.036
Mean (log real hourly earnings) below 90th percentile 4.350 4.974
Difference in means (above–below 90th percentile) 2.138 2.062
Contribution of difference in means to variance 0.411 0.383 −0.028
Percentage of total change in variance 9.06
Data from CSAE-RPED on the Ghanaian manufacturing sector from 1992 to 2003. The contribution of the difference in means has
been calculated as per the description in Section 3.2 in the text. The variance in log earnings can be arithmetically decomposed
following Barth et al. (2014) as in Eqs. (2) and (3) to calculate the contribution to variance. The percentage share has been
calculated as the change in the contribution as a share of the total change in the variance
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percentile and below the 90th percentile. I find that in 1992, the difference in these means
was 1.649 and it increased to 2.138 in 1998. Using the expression in Eq. 3, I calculate the
contribution of these mean differences to the variance in earnings.
In 1992, the difference inmean log real hourly earnings for workers above and below the
90th percentile contributed 0.245 log points of the total variation of 1.105. This number
increased to 0.411 in 1998. The increased contribution of these differences was 0.166 over
the surge period which accounts for 61.25 % of the total increase in variance during this
time period. This suggests that the increased advantage of the top earners over the rest
had a major contribution to the surge in wage dispersion in Ghana during 1992–1998.
I replicate the above analysis for the decline phase and report the statistics in panel B.
Variance in log real hourly earnings declined from 1.376 in 1998 to 1.067 in 2003, a change
of 0.309 log points. The difference in means of log real hourly earnings for workers above
and below the 90th percentile decreased from 2.138 in 1998 to 2.062 in 2003. The contri-
bution to the overall variance changed by 0.028 which is approximately 9.06 % of the total
decline in variance. So the relative advantage of the top earners was not entirely wiped
out and was not the major reason why the surge in inequality reversed. This suggests
that workers in the rest of the distribution of earnings made significant gains in the latter
phases which could probably be attributed to the sinking in of economic reforms.
5.3 Returns to schooling and earnings dispersion
I run simple Mincerian regressions as described by Eq. 4 with X denoting the observ-
ables like years of schooling, experience, and experience squared only. I use firm fixed
effects and run these regressions for two periods of time, 1992–1998 and 1998–2003. OLS
estimates of the coefficients are reported in Table 5. I find that the returns to schooling
increased over time whereas themarginal effect of experience seems to have declined over
time. Variance of the predicted earnings from education and experience has increased
from 0.109 to 0.133. This is not consistent with the fall in variance of earnings over time
suggesting that the decline in inequality is explained more by firm factors and residuals
and not necessarily by a decline in inequality of returns to schooling and experience.
Table 5 Returns to schooling and experience









Mean of Dep Var 4.568 4.654
Variance of Dep Var 1.460 1.318
Variance (X · βˆ) 0.109 0.133
Data from CSAE-RPED on the Ghanaian manufacturing sector from 1992 to 2003. I matched the worker and firm files to create the
linked dataset based on which I perform the analysis. Log real hourly earnings are measured in Ghanaian cedis. All regressions
include firm fixed effects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. ***,**, and * represent significance at 1, 5, and 10 %,
respectively
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5.4 Does predicted wage dispersion by worker and firm characteristics vary by ownership
structure?
This is the final section of the empirical analysis, and I run the regression described by
Eq. 4 using many more observable worker characteristics as controls. Since I have identi-
fied two distinctive time periods in the data for studying variance in earnings, I break up
the analysis in this segment by those time periods. So I run Eq. 4 for the surge period and
the decline period separately by pooling together the data from the years in those peri-
ods. Using the predicted values of the coefficients from these regressions, I decompose
the variance in log real hourly earnings following Eq. 5. For the surge period, I exclude the
year 1998 as it is included in the decline period to avoid double counting and maintain
distinction between the results of the two periods. Results are reported in Table 6. For
the average firm, variance in log real hourly earnings in the surge period was 1.460 and
it decreased to 1.318 in the decline period. I decompose the variances following Eq. 5. I
find that the variance in predicted wage due to observed worker characteristics increased
from 0.235 log points to 0.331 log points whereas the variance from firm-level earn-
ings decreased from 0.595 log points to 0.385 log points. This is consistent with the idea
that firm-level characteristics seem to have contributed to the decline in wage inequal-
ity in Ghana from 1998 to 2003 rather than worker characteristics. Earlier, I found that
between-firm variation seems to explain the inverted u-shaped pattern better than the
Table 6 Variance decomposition: estimated firm effects and predicted wage from worker
characteristics
Surge in inequality Decline in inequality
1992 to <1998 1998 to 2003
(1) (2)
All firms
Earnings dispersion: Var(lnw) 1.460 1.318
Individual characteristics: Var(κ) 0.235 0.331
Firm fixed effect: Var(δ) 0.595 0.385
Cov(κ , δ) 0.175 0.164
Sorting: worker–firm ρδ 0.745 0.495
Residuals: Var(u) 0.498 0.385
Firms with private domestic ownership
Earnings dispersion: Var(lnw) 1.551 1.369
Individual characteristics: Var(κ) 0.308 0.400
Firm fixed effect: Var(δ) 0.387 0.232
Cov(κ , δ) 0.124 0.081
Sorting: worker–firm ρδ 0.403 0.202
Residuals: Var(u) 0.580 0.535
Firms with any foreign ownership
Earnings dispersion: Var(lnw) 0.803 0.825
Individual characteristics: Var(κ) 0.139 0.214
Firm fixed effect: Var(δ) 0.134 0.441
Cov(κ , δ) 0.036 −0.075
Sorting: worker–firm ρδ 0.259 −0.350
Residuals: Var(u) 0.808 1.413
Data from CSAE-RPED on the Ghanaian manufacturing sector from 1992 to 2003. Regressions are extensions of Mincerian
equations and include the following independent variables: age, age squared, education, education squared, experience and its
squared, and firm fixed effects. Dependent variable is log real hourly earnings, κ is predicted wage from observed worker
characteristics, δ is firm effect on earnings, and ρδ is the correlation between the worker characteristics and firm effects
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within-firm variation and the findings in this section corroborate those. I find that the
variance in the residuals have gone down over time. The sorting factor between worker
and firm, ρδ , also decreased over time. This suggests that with time, firms have employed
workers based on observed characteristics and independent of firm-level earnings. This
also suggests the possibility that positive sorting was on the decline where higher pay
workers now joined lower average earnings firms and that helped bridge the earnings gap
and led to a reduction in inequality.
I am interested to know if the patterns for the average firm is universal among owner-
ship types or is it specifically driven by a particular organizational structure. I split the
above analysis to separately study private domestic firms and private foreign firms. I find
that the average effect is replicated for private domestic firms. The variance of κ increased
from 0.308 to 0.400 whereas the variance of the firm earnings decreased from 0.387 to
0.232. The sorting factor also decreased. However, for firms that are partially or wholly
owned by foreign private entrepreneurs, I find the opposite. Recall that for these firms,
we do not observe the inverted u-shaped pattern in 3 and there is a secular increase in
inequality for these firms. The variance of κ increased from 0.139 to 0.214 and variance of
δ increased from 0.134 to 0.441 for these firms. This suggests that the ownership structure
seems to be an important element that characterizes the unique wage variance structure
in Ghana.
6 Robustness: are these survey-specific trends?
The major finding of this paper is that there is evidence of decline in worker wage
inequality in the Ghanaian manufacturing sector and firm-specific factors in terms of
management practices may have played a significant role in this trend. One concern that
might arise here is of external validity. The dataset used in this analysis is a small sam-
ple of firms from the large manufacturing sector in Ghana. Is it possible that these trends
are just specific to this sample and may not be true for the economy overall? Additionally,
Sandefur (2010) shows that this particular panel of firms becomes increasingly unrepre-
sentative of the overall manufacturing sector and the Ghanaian economy at large over
time. One would be worried that the results of this paper may be driven by the nature of
the sample. To check for this and alleviate such concerns, I use three rounds of the Ghana
Living Standards Survey (GLSS)—3, 4, and 5 conducted in 1991, 1998, and 2005, respec-
tively. The timelines roughly correspond to the surge and decline periods identified in this
paper as above.
I use the data from the Ghana Standard of Living Survey (rounds 3–5) provided
by the World Bank as part of the World Bank SHIP database. Using data from the
labor/employment file for each of these rounds, I construct a log hourly wages variable as
follows. First, I consider their last wage received from their primary jobs, given that the
observation corresponds to employment in themanufacturing sector. I disregard observa-
tions for employent in non-manufacturing sectors. Then, I use information on the units of
this observation to convert it to weekly wages. Finally, using the number of hours actually
worked per week, I convert this to hourly wages earned.
The idea is to check if the patterns in inequality using the GLSS household survey data is
roughly similar to the findings above. GLSS is conducted by the Ghana Statistical Services
and is a household survey. I am unable to replicate the overall analysis of this paper on this
dataset as the employing firm of the workers are not identifiable and without a panel of
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firms, the firm-specific fixed effects will not be identified. However, a simple descriptive
statistics comparison does provide support to the overall findings of this paper. Results
are reported in Table 7.
It is reassuring to find that the trends in the data using the GLSS are similar to the overall
trends found using the firm-level linked dataset. I find from Table 7 that the variance in
log hourly wages for workers increased from 1.488 to 1.580 in a period corresponding to
the surge period identified in the main analysis above. Also, in the decline in inequality
period as identified above, the variance in log wages decrease from 1.580 to 1.306 in the
GLSS survey data. These patterns somewhat alleviate concerns that the trends picked up
in the analysis are due to the nature of the data being used which becomes increasingly
unrepresentative of the population. This robustness analysis provides some confidence
that the overall picture of the manufacturing sector of Ghana is being reflected in this
paper.
7 Conclusions
This paper uses a matched employer-employee dataset from the Ghanaianmanufacturing
sector to analyze earnings dispersion in Ghana from 1992 to 2003. The plot of variances
in log real hourly earnings over time indicate two clear periods of surge and decline in
inequality in Ghana. I analyze the variances in earnings from 1992 to 1998 when inequal-
ity increased and find that within- and between-firm variation increased during this
period. From 1998 to 2003, the between-firm variation declined whereas the within-firm
variation still increased. This suggests that the fall in inequality in the latter stages was
driven by between-firm effects.
I find that the earnings gap between the workers above and below the 90th percentile
explains about 61 % of the rise in inequality from 1992 to 1998 but it only explains about
9 % of the fall in inequality from 1998 to 2003. This is suggestive evidence that top earners
did not necessarily lose out their advantage in the latter stages but other workers made
significant gains to wipe out this gap.
Variance in the predicted wages from worker characteristics seem to have risen con-
sistently whereas variance from firm-level earnings have decline in the later period. The
correlation between the predicted wage by worker characteristics and the firm earnings
have also declined. This leads us to believe that changing patterns of sorting could be a
possible reason for the decline in earnings inequality in Ghana. Firms appear to have inde-
pendently hired workers based on their observed traits and even firms with low average
earnings attracted hire pay workers. This meant that inequality would be on the decline.
These patterns are however only observed in private domestic firms. Foreign-owned firms
do not seem to have such effects on earnings variance. Finally, I use household survey
data to show that similar overall trends are also observed for a different database which
alleviates concerns about external validity of this exercise.
Table 7 Analysis of variances—GLSS household survey data
1991 1998 2005
(1) (2) (3)
Variance in log hourly wages 1.488 1.580 1.306
Change 0.092 −0.274
Data from World Bank GLSS SHIP Database rounds 3, 4, and 5. Variance in log hourly earnings is a constructed variable as
described in Section 6 in the text. Even for a different dataset, an initial increase in variance is observed followed by a later decline
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Endnotes
1 In an earlier version, I also analyzed how trends in earnings dispersion differ by worker
skills but nothing unusual or interesting is happenning there which merits a place in this
paper.
2 This is true in terms of the dataset I use. Census figures may be different nonetheless.
3 In doing so, I do not intend to draw conclusions about the success (or lack thereof ) of
the economic reforms of Ghana. To be able to do a complete evaluation of the reforms,
not only would we need some exogenous variation to identify the effects of the reform but
also ideally need pre-reform data. In the absence of these, any links drawn to the reform
should be regarded as conjecture or suggestive evidence and not estimated empirical
evidence.
4 Teal (2016) however suggests that the shift in Ghana towards smaller firms implies
that there is a ‘missing middle’ in the firm size distribution of Ghana and smaller firms
tend to be less productive. However, my analysis in terms of just manufacturing firms
does not seem to suggest so, especially if one thinks reduction in inequality is closely
associated with an increase in productivity or efficiency.
5 Future research may be directed towards estimating the welfare gains from the
reforms, but this paper does not attempt to evaluate the reforms per se but just study the
peculiarity observed in patterns of wage dispersion and analyze the role of firm effects in
explaining these patterns.
6 See Natcomm report on Ghanaian manufacturing sector—http://www.natcomreport.
com/ghana/livre/manufacturing.pdf
7The survey was financed by the Overseas Development Administration (Department
of International Development).
8 The data comes from the pooled firm and worker dataset and not just plant-level data.
The log real hourly earnings are therefore worker’s earnings in firms.
9 See Ackah, Adjasi, and Turkson - http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/
Files/Papers/2014/11/learning-to-compete/L2C_WP18_Ackah-Adjasi-and-Turkson.
pdf?la=en
10To investigate this further, I looked at the variances by worker skill and found that the
inequality for low-skilled workers has reduced over time consistently. This is indicative
of the fact that as skilled workers sort into foreign firms, the unskilled (or low skilled)
workers end up in domestic firms and domestic firms have a lower skilled pool to choose
from. This may lead to a decline in dispersion for low-skilled workers.
11As is the case with the rest of the paper, this analysis draws heavily from the 2016
JOLE paper by Barth et al.
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